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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 930800-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

KIM BEDDOES,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (ii) (Supp.
1993) , in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1990), Utah's

entrapment statute, require adoption of a per se rule that
entrapment is established as a matter of law solely because law
enforcement furnished the contraband serving as the basis for
charges against a defendant during a "controlled delivery" or
"reverse sting" operation, irrespective of whether the defendant
has established the elements of entrapment?

This issue involves a question of statutory
interpretation, which is purely a question of law. Accordingly,
the trial court's implicit rejection of defendant's proposed
interpretation of § 76-2-303(1) is reviewed for correctness.
This Court need not afford any deference to the trial court's
ruling on this issue.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah

1994).
2.

Does the evidence presented at trial prove as a

matter of law that defendant was entrapped into distributing
cocaine?

A reviewing court will affirm a conviction unless the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict,
leaves no reasonable doubt that defendant was entrapped as a
matter of law.

State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1990)# Entrapment:
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit
an offense does not constitute entrapment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with possession of
a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (ii) (Supp.
1993) (R. 8). Prior to trial, defendant moved to have the charge
dismissed based on a claim of entrapment (R. 22-31).
2

After an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court took the issue under
advisement and allowed the State to submit a memorandum in
response to defendant's motion (R. 153). Shortly thereafter, the
court entered a signed ruling in which it denied defendant's
motion (R. 130-31).

(A copy of the trial court's ruling is

attached hereto as addendum A.)
Defendant renewed his entrapment defense at his jury
trial, but he was convicted as charged (R. 200). Defendant's
conviction evidences the jury's rejection of his entrapment
defense.
On appeal, defendant challenges both the trial court's
denial of his motion to dismiss based on entrapment as well as
the jury's rejection of his entrapment defense.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On November 13, 1992, Ned Shepherd was arrested by
Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol for possession
of 15 pounds of marijuana.

In a search incident to Shepherd's

arrest, a list of names with corresponding phone numbers was
found in Shepherd's wallet.

The trooper transported Shepherd to

the Juab County Jail and returned to his patrol duties (R. 3 0607, 406-07, 421).
Juab County Deputy Sheriff William Thompkins and other
officers, including two narcotics officers from Utah County,

1

Unless otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts from
the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989); see also State v.
Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989).
3

spoke with Shepherd.

Specifically, the officers questioned

Shepherd about the people on his list of names because they
recognized several as people who police were investigating for
suspected drug dealing in Juab and Utah counties. Among the
names was "Kim", the phone number for which corresponded to
defendant, Kim Beddoes.

Thompkins had previously gathered

"extensive intelligence information" on defendant because local
authorities suspected defendant was distributing narcotics (R.
342, 443). Thompkins was primarily interested in defendant
because defendant was the only person on the list who lived in
Juab County (R. 326).
Shepherd readily acknowledged that the name "Kim"
appearing on his list of names and numbers referred to defendant.
Shepherd and defendant had been friends for over twenty years (R.
425).

More importantly, Shepherd told Thompkins that he had

regularly sold drugs to defendant for many years.

In recent

transactions, Shepherd supplied defendant with approximately four
ounces of marijuana.

According to Shepherd, the purchase of four

ounces of marijuana could be solely for personal use, but it
typically indicated that the buyer was "probably purchasing it to
probably use it and sell it to be able to make his money" (R.
313).

Also, although he had never personally seen defendant sell

narcotics, Shepherd testified that in the past defendant
indicated he sold controlled substances (R. 336, 407).
In exchange for the State's reducing the possible
felony charges against him to a class B misdemeanor and foregoing
4

any forfeiture action, Shepherd agreed to help local law
enforcement "take down some drug dealers in [Juab County and]
some drug dealers in Utah County" (R. 314). Specifically,
Shepherd agreed to complete his planned deliveries to individuals
in both counties (R. 328-29, 407-08, 447-48).

According to

Shepherd, even though he had no specific arrangement with
defendant to deliver any marijuana to him on November 13, 1992,
he was planning to deliver some of the 15 pounds of marijuana to
defendant (R. 407, 418, 428, 547).

That expectation was based

on the fact that the last time he had spoken to defendant,
defendant had requested marijuana.

Shepherd told defendant he

was going to get some more in about a month, but he never
provided defendant a specific date of delivery (R. 407-08, 42829, 463-64) . However, Shepherd did not even tell his wife when
he left for California to get the marijuana; he just did it (R.
417) •
After Shepherd agreed to complete his deliveries in
return for leniency, Thompkins asked Shepherd how much marijuana
would be an appropriate amount to deliver to defendant (R. 412).
Shepherd replied, "a pound" (R. 321, 409, 426, 445). Shepherd
also told Thompkins that his normal price for a pound of
marijuana was $1,600 and that defendant owed him $450 from a
prior transaction (R. 327, 411-413).
Police then had Shepherd call defendant at his house.
Shepherd tried to call defendant several times, but defendant
apparently did not hear the phone ringing because he was outside
5

chopping wood (R. 329). Eventually, defendant answered the
phone.

Shepherd told defendant, "Kim, this is Shep.

Stay home.

I'll be there in a minute" (R. 315, 425). The cursory telephone
conversation was not unusual for Shepherd and defendant.

Indeed,

Shepherd testified that he assumed defendant would then expect a
delivery of drugs because when he "was going to deliver drugs,
that's all [he] would say" (R. 329-30, 407-09).
Shepherd was fitted with a "Fargo Unit" - - a listening
device that allowed the police to monitor and record the
conversation between defendant and Shepherd at the time of the
drug sale.

Thompkins retrieved a package of marijuana from the

department's evidence room and weighed it. Although it weighed
23 ounces instead of the planned 16 ounces, the officers decided
it would be better not to dismantle the 23 once package in order
to break it down to a pound.

The package was given to Shepherd,

and he was instructed to take his car and complete the deliver to
defendant.

The officers monitored the transaction via the Fargo

Unit (R. 410, 445-56, 544).
Shepherd went to defendant's house at approximately
5:07 p.m.

Defendant met Shepherd outside, and Shepherd asked

defendant if he had any money.

Defendant said, "no," and the two

entered the house together through a sliding door in the
basement.

Shepherd handed defendant the bag of marijuana and

told that it was a pound.

He also told defendant the pound would

cost him $1,600 plus the $450 that he owed from their previous
deal for a total of $2,050 (R. 545). Defendant never indicated

6

he did not want the marijuana or argue about the price (R. 413,
548-49) . Defendant simply responded, "okay" (R. 331), and
Shepherd turned around and left (R. 320, 410-13).
When he was questioned about why he gave defendant the
marijuana even though he did not receive any money for it from
defendant, Shepherd explained that he "fronted" the marijuana to
defendant as he had done in the past.

"Fronting" is the practice

of providing marijuana to a person without requiring them to pay
for it upon delivery.

It is a common practice in the illegal

drug industry because the high cost of narcotics makes them
difficult to purchase.

"Fronting" enables dealers to have a

supply for resale, and the understanding is that the proceeds
from those transactions will be used to pay for the marijuana
that was previously delivered as well as toward the next
shipment.

Although Shepherd acknowledged that it was extremely

unusual for him to "front" marijuana to someone without first
eliminating an existing debt, Shepherd frequently "fronted"
marijuana to his customers (R. 327-28, 549-50).
Shepherd was in defendant's house for about three
minutes, and defendant did not question him about either the
prior debt, the amount delivered, or the price.

Shepherd did

acknowledge that defendant may have been surprised by the amount
of marijuana, but he testified that defendant did not otherwise
seem surprised by the delivery (R. 320, 413, 548).
The officers obtained and executed a search warrant for
defendant's house.

Even though the warrant was executed on a no
7

knock basis, by the time the officers got to defendant he was
already in the bathroom and had attempted to flush the marijuana
down the toilet.

Thompkins, however, was able to retrieve the

marijuana before defendant could to dispose of it. During a
search of the house, the officers found baggies located near a
scale.

In the same area, they found a silver colored tray

containing marijuana and a pipe.

Several firearms also were

seized (R. 4-5, 449-58).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly refused to adopt defendant's
proposed per se rule of entrapment for cases in which law
enforcement personal furnish the contraband used in a "reversed
sting" operation.

Defendant's proposed rule is inconsistent with

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1990), because under that provision
a defendant asserting a defense of entrapment must demonstrate
that the methods used by police created a substantial risk that
person not otherwise ready to commit the offense commit by the
defendant would have been induced to do so. Whether the
furnishing of contraband creates such a risk, or merely provides
a defendant with an opportunity to commit a crime, should be
resolved on a case-by-case basis. Under the facts presented at
the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss based on entrapment,
the trial court properly determined that the issue should be
submitted to the jury.

Its denial of defendant's motion should

therefore be affirmed.
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Similarly, the evidence presented at defendant's trial,
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict of
guilty, does not prove as a matter of law that defendant was
entrapped into purchasing marijuana from the police informant.
The informant made no extreme pleas of desperate illness, appeals
based on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers
of sex or inordinate sums of money in order to obtain narcotics
from defendant.

Although the informant and defendant had been

friends for twenty years, there was no evidence that the
informant traded on that friendship to induce defendant to
purchase marijuana.

Nor does the fact that the informant

"fronted" the marijuana to defendant because defendant did not
then have cash to pay for the contraband demonstrate that
defendant was entrapped.

Fronting is a common practice in the

drug industry, and the informant had fronted narcotics to
defendant in prior transactions.

These issues were properly

reserved for the jury's determination, and the jury's
determination should be affirmed because it is not incorrect as a
matter of law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MERE FACT THAT POLICE FURNISHED
CONTRABAND TO DEFENDANT VIA AN INFORMANT DOES
NOT ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPPED
UNDER EITHER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1)
(1990) OR UTAH CASE LAW
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
dismiss based on a defense of entrapment because defendant failed
9

to establish that, as a matter of law, the methods employed by
law enforcement officials created a substantial risk that the
offense would have been committed by a person not otherwise ready
to commit it.

The thrust of defendant's claim below was that

whenever police provide the contraband that serve as the basis
for a defendant's arrest entrapment is established as a matter of
law.

Likewise, defendant asks this Court adopt "the per se rule

that, without more, police conduct of furnishing controlled
substances to citizens in an attempt to ferret out criminals
establishes entrapment as a matter of law."

Br. of Appellant at

14.
This Court should reject defendant's proposed per se
rule because it is contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1)
(1990).

Section 76-2-303(1) requires a showing that the police

conduct created a substantial risk that persons not otherwise
prepared to do so would have been induced to commit the offense
committed by the defendant.

Adoption of defendant's proposed per

se rule would, in many cases such as this one, eliminate the
statutorily required showing of improper inducement.
Accordingly, the determination of whether entrapment is
established during a "controlled delivery" or in "reverse sting"
operations is best made on a case-by-case basis.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1990) defines entrapment,
stating in pertinent part:
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
10

evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit
an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(Emphasis added).
Despite the plain language of § 76-2-303(1) requiring
him to demonstrate that the police methods created a substantial
risk of inducement, defendant asks this Court to adopt a per se
rule of entrapment that will relieve him of his burden of showing
inducement.

Although a few courts have adopted the per se rule

advocated by defendant under an objective theory of entrapment,
the majority and better reasoned position requires that the
determination of whether a defendant was entrapped be made on a
case-by-case basis.
Even a cursory reading of the cases defendant relies
upon for adoption of a per se rule of entrapment demonstrates
that they are not driven by a concern that the method necessarily
creates a substantial risk of inducement.

Rather, they are

predicated on the notion that the "[objective] entrapment defense
is treated primarily as a curb upon improper law enforcement
techniques."

State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437, 443 (N.D. 1992)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See also State

v. Evans, 550 P.2d 830, 845 (Alaska 1976) ("In Alaska, it was
expressly for the purpose of ensuring adequate supervision of law
enforcement practices that we adopted the objective theory of
entrapment.").
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With the goal of supervising police conduct as their
starting point, the jurisdictions that have adopted a per se rule
of entrapment in reverse sting cases almost invariably engage in
lengthy discussions about why, as a matter of public policy, it
is inappropriate for police to supply narcotics under any
circumstances.

Kummer, upon which defendant relies heavily, is

illustrative.
In Kummer, the police officers supplied cocaine from
the department's evidence room to an informant who then sold the
cocaine to the defendant, a suspected drug dealer.

After the

sale was completed, the police arrested the defendant for
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 438-38.
Kummer raised an entrapment defense, which was rejected
by the trial court.

On appeal, he argued that he was entrapped

as matter of law because the police "had to create and commit a
crime" in order to arrest him.

Kummer, 481 N.W. 2d at 441. The

majority stated that defendants advancing an entrapment defense
"must establish two elements: that law enforcement agents induced
the commission of the crime and that the method of inducement was
likely to cause normally law-abiding person to commit the
offense."

Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 441 (citation omitted).

Its

subsequent analysis, however, does not address the inducement
requirement.
Without ever explaining why the police provision of the
narcotics is always "likely to cause normally law-abiding
12

person[s] to commit the offense [,]" the North Dakota Supreme
Court went to great lengths to condemn the practice of reverse
stings in narcotics cases.

It concluded that the provision of

narcotics by police was improper because the furnishing of
contraband by police lacks the element of necessity that
traditionally justifies police commission of crimes in undercover
operations.

Under Kummer, police can never make a controlled

sale or delivery of narcotics to a suspected drug dealer.
must instead complete only controlled drug buys.

They

Id. at 443.

The court reasoned that, "like the exclusionary rule in search
cases, [the per se entrapment rule] can be seen as a prophylactic
rule intended to protect innocent persons from police action
intended for the guilty.

An agent who feels free to give drugs

to targets creates a danger of corrupting the innocent that an
agent who merely makes decoy purchases does not."

Id. (citation

omitted).
The majority in Kummer also emphasized that when law
enforcement officers possess and sell narcotics in reverse sting
operations "there is a chance not only that the drugs will be
used by the recipients, including novice users, but also that the
drugs will be diverted to illegal channels."
omitted).

Id. (citation

Accordingly, it adopted a per se rule of entrapment

because it "eliminates any excuse for law enforcement officers or
agents to possess controlled substances, except during that brief
span between the seizure or undercover purchase and the placement

13

of the drugs in the police evidence locker, thereby facilitating
enforcement of anticorruption measures.

Id. (citation omitted).

The Kummer majority unwisely resorted to an entrapment
analysis to condemn what it viewed as distasteful police conduct
without articulating why the use of reverse stings in narcotics
cases always creates a substantial risk that a person not
otherwise ready to commit the offense will be induced to commit a
crime simply because police provide the contraband underlying the
prosecution.

As for the court's concerns about narcotics falling

into the wrong hands and possible police corruption, neither
issue has any bearing on the question of entrapment.

More

importantly, any "prophylactic" benefit from such a per se rule
is equally well served by application of traditional objective
entrapment standards on a case-by-case basis.

Further, a case-

by- case approach avoids insulating those who were not in fact
entrapped from prosecution, as appeared to be the case in Kummer.
Indeed, Justice Vande Walle, who concurred only in the result
reached in Kummer, emphasized that Kummer was not entrapped:
I cannot fathom why a law enforcement officer
who, undercover, offers to sell narcotics,
induces the commission of an offense by
persuasion or other means likely to cause
normally law abiding persons to commit the
offense anymore than if the defendant is
offered narcotics by someone not a law
enforcement officer. The defendant does not
know that either seller is an undercover
agent. To assume, as matter of law, that a
defendant who is normally law abiding will
purchase from a person who is an undercover
agent but would not purchase from a seller
who is not an undercover agent is
disingenuous at best.
14

Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 444-45 (Vande Walle, J., concurring
specially).
Justice Vande Walle also took issue with the rationale
for adopting a per se rule of entrapment offered by other
jurisdictions:
Nevertheless, as noted by the majority
opinion, a number of jurisdictions have
adopted this tortured rationale. The logic
of it escapes me, particularly in those
jurisdictions which have adopted an
"objective" standard for entrapment similar
to that of North Dakota. The only
explanation I can offer is that the courts,
having determined that the actions of law
enforcement officers were unacceptable as a
matter of public policy, believed it
necessary to cast their opinions in more
traditional terms and, perhaps, more tenable
forms such as entrapment.
Id.
Other courts addressing the issue of whether police
provision of the narcotics underlying a defendant's prosecution
have refused to adopt a per se rule of entrapment for reasons
similar to those identified by Justice Vande Walle.

For

instance, the supreme courts of both Michigan and Hawaii have
recently rejected the claim that entrapment per se is established
when police execute reverse stings in narcotics cases. See
People v. Jamieson. 461 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 1990); State v.
Agrabante, 830 P.2d 492 (Hawaii 1992).

Their opinions are

typical of those courts rejecting a proposed per se rule of
entrapment under the objective standard.
Hawaii, like Utah, applies the objective standard for
entrapment.

Agrabante, 492 P.2d at 499.
15

Indeed, the pertinent

portion of Hawaii's entrapment statute is very similar to § 76-2303 (1) :
(1) In any prosecution, it is an
affirmative defense that the defendant was
engaged in the prohibited conduct or caused
the prohibited result because he was induced
or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement
officer, or a person acting in cooperation
with a law enforcement officer, who, for the
purpose of obtaining evidence of the
commission of an offense, either:
• • •

(b) Employed methods of persuasion or
inducement which created a substantial
risk
that the offense would be committed bypersons other than those who are ready to
commit
it.
Hawaii Revised Statute § 702-237 (1985) (emphasis added).
Agrabante purchased cocaine from an undercover police
officer in a reverse sting operation.

The agreed price for the

cocaine was $1,000, but Agrabante had only $690 with him.

After

some discussion, the undercover agent agreed that Agrabante could
pay the balance the next day, collected the $690, and gave the
cocaine to Agrabante.

After the undercover agent gave a signal

to nearby officers, the police arrested Agrabante. Agrabante,
830 P.2d at 493.
Agrabante was convicted, and on appeal he urged the
Hawaii Supreme Court to hold that reverse stings constitute
entrapment per se on the grounds that "the police themselves were
the ones who provided and sold the cocaine, and but for those
actions, . . . the offense for which [defendant] was convicted
would not have occurred."
omitted).

Id. at 499 (internal quotation marks

The court not only refused to adopt a per se rule of
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entrapment, but also affirmed the lower court's determination
that Agrabante was not entrapped:
In this case, there is no evidence that the
reverse [sting] operation exhibited or
displayed cocaine for sale to the general
public or in any manner persuaded or induced
persons other than those who were actively
seeking to purchase such illegal drugs. Not
only is the record devoid of any evidence
that defendant was persuaded or induced by
the police to purchase the cocaine, defendant
did not have any contact with [the undercover
agent] prior to . . . the date of the
transaction.
In this case, the police merely provided
defendant an opportunity, as opposed to an
inducement, to commit the charged offense.
Agrabante, 830 P.2d at 500 (citations omitted).
By the same token, the Michigan Supreme Court in
Jamieson rejected an entrapment defense stemming from a reverse
sting operation.

In so doing, the court explained that the

entrapment statute was not a catch-all provision to enable
reviewing courts to supervise the police and emphasized that
defendants had to show inducement in order to establish
entrapment under the objective standard:
[T]he defense of entrapment was not intended
to be the remedy for any and all misconduct
or neglect by police and their agents. The
defense is only a remedy for conduct likely,
when objectively considered, to induce or
instigate the commission of the crime by a
person not ready and willing to commit it.
Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d at 892 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (emphasis added).

The Jamieson court then held

that the trial court's finding of entrapment under the objective
standard was clearly erroneous because the police activity in
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that case "served only to provide an opportunity for [the]
defendants to engage in criminal activity."

Id. at 897.

Jamieson also serves as an excellent example of why a
per se rule of entrapment sweeps too broadly.

In that case, the

defendants were all guards at a county jail.

Authorities learned

from an inmate that some of the guards were accepting money from
inmates in return for smuggling contraband to them.

Police had

the informant ask the guards to pick up some drugs from his
outside source, an uncover officer posing as a friend of the
inmate.

Several agreed to do so, and they each charged the

informant a fee to smuggle the drugs into the jail.

Once the

authorities verified that the drugs given to the informant were
the same ones that they had provided the guards, the guards were
arrested.

As the Jamieson court recognized, the defendants in

that case "were not unwary or vulnerable.

To the contrary, they

were trained in law enforcement, sworn to uphold the law, and
spent their working days in a most controlled environment in
which they were in charge."

Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d at 897. Nor

were any of the traditional touchstones of entrapment, such as
repeated requests for drugs or appeals based on friendship or
sympathy, evidenced in the case.

Id. at 893.

Had the Jamieson court adopted a per se rule of
entrapment, the guards would have been insulated from prosecution
under facts that fell far short of satisfying the traditional
objective entrapment standard.

It is therefore difficult to see

how the per se rule serves the public interest any better than
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application of the objective standard on a case by case basis. On
the contrary, the per se rule appears to hinder legitimate
prosecutions without providing any tangible benefit.
Like Jamieson. this case is a good example of why a per
se rule of entrapment sweeps too broadly.

It is clear that the

police here did not create a crime by providing the marijuana
that defendant purchased.

Defendant had previously indicated to

Shepherd that he wanted some marijuana, and Shepherd was planning
to deliver a pound of marijuana to defendant.

Fortuitously,

police arrested Shepherd in Juab County before his deal with
defendant had been consummated.

Juab County officials took the

opportunity to record the previously planned transaction in an
effort to secure a conviction against a local drug dealer.
Police did not initiate the transaction; they merely allowed it
to be completed.

What occurred in this case was not a reverse

sting of the sort that Kummer found so problematic.

Rather, it

was what is commonly known as a "controlled delivery" that was
already scheduled to be completed before the police became
involved (R. 444).
Like Hawaii and Michigan, Utah courts have never held
that a defendant was entrapped merely because they found the
government conduct distasteful.

Those few jurisdictions that

have adopted the per se rule of entrapment have failed to
articulate how reverse stings necessarily result in inducement.
Instead, they have taken issue with use of the practice in
narcotics cases on public policy grounds.
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In so doing, those

courts have mistakenly permitted the separate and distinct
defense of "outrageous government conduct" to masquerade as
entrapment.

Under State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App.

1992), the trial court properly refused to be drawn into that
quagmire.
In Richardson, the defendant argued that he was
entrapped into distributing narcotics as a matter of law because
the conduct between the police and the informant who purchased
the narcotics from the defendant was outrageous.

In so doing,

Richardson conceded that the conduct between himself and the
informant did not constitute entrapment. Nevertheless,
Richardson argued that "the government's conduct . . . was so
outrageous that [his] conviction, resulting from that conduct,
should not be allowed to stand."

Richardson, 843 P.2d at 519.

In rejecting Richardson's claim, this Court emphasized that:
under Utah law, the propriety of [government
action] is measured by its probable effect
upon a hypothetical person in the setting in
which the inducement took place. Under Utah
law, therefore, the statutory entrapment
defense is available only if there is
impropriety by the government in its contacts
with defendant, to the extent that an
ordinary person in defendant's situation
would be induced to commit a crime.
Richardson, 843 P.2d at 520 (internal quotation marks, citations
and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

In sum, Richardson

sought an expansion of Utah's entrapment statute to include the
defense of outrageous government conduct.

Id. at 520 n.5. This

Court held that "the expansion sought is inconsistent with both
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rstate v. Tavlor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)] and [Utah's
entrapment] statute and, therefore, impermissible."

Id.

While the facts of this case are plainly
distinguishable from those of Richardson, the legal principle at
stake in both cases is constant: Under § 76-2-303(1) as
interpreted in Taylor, a defendant must always demonstrate that
the government's methods created as substantial risk that a
person not otherwise ready to do so would have committed the
offense committed by the defendant.

Richardson. 843 P.2d at 519.

In contrast, the defense of outrageous government
conduct is "an alternative protection for criminal defendants
where governmental conduct is at issue" that some jurisdictions
have recognized under a due process theory.
at 519 n.3.

Richardson. 843 P.2d

See also State v. Keitz. 856 P.2d 685, 687 n.l (Utah

App. 1993) (rejecting defendant's claim that outrageous
government conduct violated his due process rights under both
state and federal constitutions). See generally Rivera v. State.
846 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 1993) (The court provides a detailed
discussion of the outrageous government conduct defense as it
relates to entrapment and explains that "[a]Ithough it bears some
similarity to the objective theory of entrapment, this defense
should not be confused with either of the traditional approaches
to the entrapment defense.").

But see United States v. Tucker.

28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that defense known as
outrageous governmental conduct, allegedly grounded in notions of
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due process and fundamental fairness, does not exist and deciding
to no longer entertain such claims).
In this case, defendant has never presented a
process or outrageous governmental conduct defense.

due

This Court

should therefore, as it did in Richardson, refuse to consider
such a claim.

See Richardson. 843 P.2d at 519 n.4 (recognizing

due process cases cited by defendant to support his outrageous
governmental conduct claim of entrapment but refusing to address
claim under due process clause because that argument was not
presented to trial court or on appeal).2
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT DEPENDANT WAS ENTRAPPED INTO
PURCHASING MARIJUANA
The evidence presented at trial does not demonstrate
that defendant was, as a matter of law, entrapped into committing
the offense for which he was convicted.

At trial, defendant

relied solely on his entrapment defense, and the jury was
2

Defendant also claims that the trial court failed to enter
findings of fact on the issue of entrapment before sending the
issue to the jury and that a remand for the entry of findings is
therefore necessary. That assertion is misplaced because no
conflicting testimony was presented at the hearing on defendant's
motion to dismiss based on entrapment. See State v. Ramirez. 817
P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (reviewing court may infer findings
where it would be reasonable to assume trial court made such
findings). The trial court's order denying defendant's motion
clearly states that it was denied because "[t]he conduct of the
arresting officers comported with a fair and honorable
administration of justice, and did not create a substantial risk
that an average person would have been induced to commit the
crime Defendant Kim Beddoes committed" (R. 130-31). That ruling,
in light of the uncontested testimony at defendant's entrapment
hearing, satisfies the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2303(4) (1990) .
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properly instructed on it.

Therefore, by convicting defendant,

the jury necessarily found that defendant was not entrapped into
committing the offense of possessing marijuana with intent to
distribute.

In this circumstance, asserting entrapment on appeal

is considered a challenge to the jury verdict, even where a
defendant argues that he was entrapped "as a matter of law."
See, e.g., State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 499, 501 (Utah 1989);
State v. Martin, 713 P.2d 60,61 (Utah 1986).
In reviewing the jury's rejection of defendant's
entrapment defense, this Court will review the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict.

Moore, 782 P.2d at 501. Reversal is proper only if the

Court determines that reasonable minds, acting fairly on the
evidence, must have had a reasonable doubt that defendant was
entrapped.

State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Utah App.

1993); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah App. 1993).
In Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court provided some
guidance to determine whether or not entrapment has occurred:
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or
appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or
close personal friendship, or offers of
inordinate sums of money, are examples,
depending on an evaluation of circumstances
in each case, of what might constitute
prohibited police conduct.
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503.
Applying the Taylor test, Utah courts have found
entrapment where an agent or confidential informant badgered or
appealed to the pity or sympathy of a person.
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See State v.

Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah 1987) (agent sold herself as
an attractive single mother on hard times);

State v. Sprague,

680 P.2d 404, 405 (Utah 1984) (agent prodded defendant whom he
had no reason to believe was involved with drugs); State v.
Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980) (repetitive request
for drugs by agent); Taylor, 599 P.2d at 498-99, 503-04
(defendant's former lover and close friend played on his sympathy
and pity during her apparent withdrawal from heroin); State v.
Soroushirn. 571 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1977) (agent badgered
defendant).
Conversely, Utah courts have consistently refused to
overturn jury verdicts in the absence of "personalized highpressure tactics or appeals to extreme vulnerability."

State v.

Martin, 713 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah 1986) . See, e.g., State v. Moore,
782 P.2d at 501 ("no pleas of desperation or appeals based
primarily on sympathy or close personal friendship"); State v.
Udell, 728 P.2d at 133 (defendant was known drug user, had
previously sold drugs to agent, and refused only when he had none
to sell); State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Utah App. 1989)
(agent "did not resort to pity, sympathy, or money"); State v.
Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah App. 1988) (no badgering, pleas,
or high pressure tactics; " [a]11 the officers had to do was ask"
for drugs), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); State v.
Wright. 744 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah App. 1987) (family relationship
not exploited; "no pleas of desperation of appeals to friendship
or loyalty").
24

The Utah Supreme Court has even upheld the use of a
reverse sting operation against a claim of entrapment in a case
involving attempt to receive stolen property.
569 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).

State v. Sommers.

In Sommers. police were investigating

the defendant because they suspected he was "fencing" stolen
property.

An undercover officer borrowed a color television from

a local merchant and took it the defendant's place of business.
He told defendant the television was stolen and offered to sell
it to the defendant.

The defendant agreed, and he paid the

undercover officer $40.00.

The Court easily rejected the

defendant's claim that he was entrapped as a matter of law and
held that the police merely afforded the defendant an opportunity
to commit the crime.

Id. at 1112. As this case demonstrates,

there is no logical basis for distinguishing police provision of
supposedly stolen property to suspected "fences" from police
provision of narcotics to suspected drug dealers.

The entrapment

analysis in both settings must always focus on the question of
improper inducement.
It is undisputed that Shepherd and defendant had been
friends for some twenty years. While defendant makes much of the
fact, his argument ignores the key principle behind the defense
of entrapment: the mere existence of a relationship, however
close, does not establish entrapment.

Shepherd never exploited

the relationship between he and defendant in order to induce
defendant to purchase the marijuana.

There is no evidence that

Shepherd conditioned the relationship on the defendant's purchase
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of drugs or offered defendant the marijuana at an unreasonably
low price under the guise of friendship. On the contrary, the
evidence established that the price Shepherd quoted defendant for
the pound of marijuana was in keeping with its market value.
Shepherd engaged in no "[e]extreme pleas of desperate illness or
appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal
friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money."

Taylor, 599

P.2d at 503. None were necessary.
This case is akin to Moore.

In that case, the

defendant and the confidential informant had mutual friends, met
at local bars, and the informant had been to defendant's home six
or seven times and had spent one night there at a drug party.
Moore 782 P.2d at 501. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, stating:
Regardless of defendant's view of their
relationship, friendship alone does not
constitute entrapment. Under the Taylor
standard, there were no pleas of desperation
or appeals based primarily on sympathy or
close friendship, nor were there offers of
inordinate sums of money. The conduct of the
confidential informant was [a] proper use of
governmental authority.
Id.

This Court has likewise echoed that sentiment.

See, e.g.,

LeVasseur, 854 P.2d at 1025; Martinez, 848 P.2d at 707.
The transaction that occurred between Shepherd and
defendant was executed in the same way it would have been had
Shepherd not been arrested by police before he completed his
deliveries.

The only difference was that police monitored the

transaction via a Fargo Unit to ensure they would be able to
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obtain a search warrant for defendant's house when the.
transaction was finished.
Defendant also contends Shepherd's decision to allow
defendant to have the marijuana without first requiring him to
pay for it is the equivalent of providing an inordinate sum of
money under Tavlor.
specious.

Br. of Appellant at 13. That claim is

The record demonstrates that defendant was not "given"

the marijuana.

On the contrary, he agreed to pay Shepherd $1,600

for the purported pound of marijuana.

The mere fact that

Shepherd handed the marijuana to defendant even after defendant
said he did not have money at the time of the delivery does not
mean that Shepherd offered it to defendant free of charge as
defendant implies.

Instead, as defendant admits in his brief,

Shepherd only "fronted" him the marijuana.

Br. of App. at 11.

As Shepherd testified, "fronting" is the practice of
providing contraband to dealers without requiring them to pay for
it at the time of delivery.

Shepherd also testified that

the practice is often necessary because of the high cost of
illegal narcotics and indicated that he regularly fronts drugs to
his customers.

Shepherd's testimony about the practice of

fronting is consistent with the experience of other courts. See,
e.g.. State v. Rivera, 846 P.2d 1, 5 (Wyo. 1993) ("While the
police did 'front' a portion of the purchase price, 'fronting' is
quite prevalent in the illegal drug business, and that alone is
not enough to show outrageous government conduct.").
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Defendant correctly notes that he already owed Shepherd
approximately $450 from a prior transaction in which Shepherd had
fronted him a quantity of marijuana and that Shepherd testified
his practice was not to front additional drugs to a customer
until the prior debt was paid.

The fact that Shepherd departed

from his usual practice in this case, however, does not compel
the conclusion that defendant was induced to agree to purchase
the marijuana.

The issue of what impact the fronting of the

marijuana would have had on a person not otherwise prepared to
commit the offense committed by defendant was properly reserved
for the jury.

Under the facts presented and in light of

Shepherd's testimony about the practice of fronting, the jury
could have reasonably concluded that defendant was not improperly
induced into purchasing marijuana from Shepherd.

Rather, they

could have reasonably determined that defendant willingly
incurred an additional debt of $1,600 in order to obtain the
marijuana offered to him by Shepherd.
Defendant also makes much of the fact that he was not
expecting a delivery from Shepherd on the day in question.

That

assertion, though true, is potentially misleading in light of the
record as a whole.

Defendant clearly was expecting delivery of

marijuana from Shepherd at some time.

The evidence indicated

that defendant told Shepherd he wanted marijuana when the two
last met in person.

Shepherd testified that he intended to

deliver one pound of the 15 pounds of marijuana he had in his car
to defendant and the remaining 14 pounds to a distributor in Utah
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County.

The fact that Shepherd was arrested before he was able

to complete his deliveries presented Juab County law enforcement
officers an excellent opportunity to go after a local drug
dealer.

Accordingly, defendant's deal with Shepherd was

completed as planned while police monitored and recorded the
transaction.

The only reason why defendant did not know when

Shepherd was going to make the delivery is because Shepherd did
not know when he would be able to get the marijuana to sell to
defendant.

From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably

decided that defendant asked Shepherd to supply him with
marijuana as soon as Shepherd was able to do so and that the date
of delivery was inconsequential.

In any event, the evidence

clearly showed that defendant unhesitatingly agreed to purchase
the marijuana from Shepherd.
In summary, none of the traditional touchstones of
entrapment identified by the Court in Taylor are present in this
case.

Defendant had previously asked Shepherd to get some

marijuana for him.

When Shepherd offered to sell defendant a

pound of marijuana at its market value, defendant accepted the
offer without being subjected to any pressure or pleas.

"Where

there is a reasonable basis in evidence upon which jurors could
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was a result of
a defendant's own voluntary desire and intent to commit the
crime, the fact that a police officer merely afforded him the
opportunity to commit it, does not amount to entrapment."
v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 1980).
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State

The State presented

ample evidence at trial upon which jurors could and did conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Shepherd's conduct at most
afforded defendant an opportunity to commit the offense.

This

Court should therefore affirm the jury's determination that
defendant was not entrapped.
CONCLUSION
Because the evidence presented at trial does not
demonstrate that defendant was entrapped as a matter of law, and
because the trial court properly refused to adopt defendant's
proposed per se rule of entrapment, this Court should affirm
defendant's conviction.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
Trial Court's Denial of
i d a n t ' s Motion t o Dis
Based on Entrapment

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. D-CR-920185

vs.
KIM BHDDOES and ANNK1TE
BEDDOES,

RULING
!

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss and Motions to Suppress Evidence. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the
memoranda of counsel, having entertained oral argument, and upon being advised in the
premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the charges against Defendant Annette Beddoes

is granted. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the arresting officers had probable cause
to sustain the charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and
possession of drug paraphernalia.
2.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on grounds of entrapment of Kim Beddoes is

denied. The conduct of the arresting officers comported with a fair and honorable
administration of justice, and did not create a substantial risk that an average person would
have been induced to commit the crime Defendant Kim Beddoes committed.
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3-

Defendants* Motion to Suppress evidence of drug paraphernalia is denied.

The officer who found the drug paraphernalia, Chief Bowles, was legally on the premises
pursuant to a valid warrant authorizing the search for drugs and found the drug paraphernalia
in plain view while searching for those drugs.
4,

Defendants' Motion to Suppress on grounds of illegally concealed recording

device is denied. The informant upon whom the device was concealed consented to
recording the conversation with Defendant Kim Beddoes. Since at least one party to the
recorded conversation consented, no eavesdropping occurred and UCA §76-9-402(l)(a) does
not apply.

Dated this ^ 7 d a y of May, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
Shelden Carter
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